Increasing global economic integration and recent military interventions in the name of human rights have forced questions of global justice into political discussions. Is the unequal distribution of wealth across the globe just? What's wrong with imperialism? Are the most indebted countries obligated to pay back their loans to international financ.

_Popper’s Critical Rationalism_ presents Popper’s views on science, knowledge, and inquiry, and examines the significance and tenability of these in light of recent developments in philosophy of science, philosophy of probability, and epistemology. It develops a fresh and novel philosophical position on science, which employs key insights from Popper while rejecting other elements of his philosophy. Central theses include: Crucial questions about scientific method arise at the level of the group, rather than that of the individual. Although criticism is vital (...) for science, dogmatism is important too. Belief in scientific theories is permissible even in the absence of evidence in their favour. The aim of science is to eliminate false theories. Critical rationalism can be understood as a form of virtue epistemology. (shrink)

Matthias Vogel challenges the belief, dominant in contemporary philosophy, that reason is determined solely by our discursive, linguistic abilities as communicative beings. In his view, the medium of language is not the only force of reason. Music, art, and other nonlinguistic forms of communication and understanding are also significant. Introducing an expansive theory of mind that accounts for highly sophisticated, penetrative media, Vogel advances a novel conception of rationality while freeing philosophy from its exclusive attachment to linguistics. Vogel's media of (...) reason treats all kinds of understanding and thought, propositional and nonpropositional, as important to the processes and production of knowledge and thinking. By developing an account of rationality grounded in a new conception of media, he raises the profile of the prelinguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of rationality and advances the Enlightenment project, buffering it against the postmodern critique that the movement fails to appreciate aesthetic experience. Guided by the work of Jürgen Habermas, Donald Davidson, and a range of media theorists, including Marshall McLuhan, Vogel rebuilds, if he does not remake, the relationship among various forms of media -- books, movies, newspapers, the Internet, and television -- while offering an original and exciting contribution to media theory. (shrink)

This article reviews the book "Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science" by Howard Sankey.

This paper shows that Bertrand's proposed 'solutions' to his own question, which generates his chord paradox, are inapplicable. It uses a simple analogy with cake cutting. The problem is that none of Bertrand's solutions considers all possible cuts. This is no solace for the defenders of the principle of indifference, however, because it emerges that the paradox is harder to solve than previously anticipated.

Metz’s contribution to environmental ethics is a novel theory of moral status, which he argues explains the intuition that although we have direct moral duties to some nonhuman animals, our duties to fellow human beings are always weightier. The theory takes the moral status of an individual to depend on it being the subject and object of friendly relations with human. This paper argues that the account of moral status explains the intuition about the existence and relative weight of duties (...) to nonhuman animals only if evidence of human-nonhuman animal cooperation is ignored. The paper argues additionally that a focus on the moral status of individual nonhuman animals offers no insight into one the most pressing environmental problems of our time, the threat of mass species extinction. Finally, the duties that would seem to follow from the account of moral status are contrary a traditional environmental concern of nature preservation. (shrink)

This paper challenges Bird’s view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, by arguing that unjustified scientific beliefs (and/or changes in belief) may nevertheless be progressive. It also argues that false beliefs may promote progress.

Abstract Right intention is one of the staple criteria of traditional just war theory. In classical terms, right intention is met when a belligerent aims to achieve a just and peaceful order. I will address the problem of determining when a belligerent has satisfied the criterion of right intention. I will argue that right intention is determined by observing a belligerent's acts during and after a conflict. Intention is not merely a private mental act known ultimately only by the people (...) who express the intentions of their governments. Rather, right intention is a communal, public act, for the observable circumstances are how intention is determined. I will demonstrate the effectiveness of this way of determining intention by concentrating on the stated intentions of the Allies before World War II and of the U.S. before the First and Second Gulf Wars. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that the international community can check a belligerent's stated intentions both while the war is in progress and after the war has ended. I will argue that how well a belligerent conforms to the jus in bello and, when appropriate, to the jus post bellum, provide the international community with much of the information it needs to determine whether or not right intention has been met. (shrink)

This article shows that Popper’s measure of corroboration is inapplicable if, as Popper argued, the logical probability of synthetic universal statements is zero relative to any evidence that we might possess. It goes on to show that Popper’s definition of degree of testability, in terms of degree of logical content, suffers from a similar problem. 1 The Corroboration Function and P(h|b) 2 Degrees of Testability and P(h|b).

Bangu (2010) claims that Bertrand’s paradox rests on a hitherto unrecog nized assumption, which assumption is sufficiently dubious to throw the burden of proof back onto ‘objectors to [the principle of indifference]’ (2010: 31). We show that Bangu’s objection to the assumption is ill-founded and that the assumption is provably true.

If one cares about one’s opponent in a game – if one identifies with one’s opponent – then this may affect how one ought to play. But how should we treat this in game theory? Rowbottom would present a novel, 'changing places', model of identification; the key insight is to introduce probabilities for outcomes to be swapped when games conclude. First, he would argue that this model is superior to its main rival, the ‘pooled resources’ view, in treating some multiplayer (...) games. Second, he would illustrate how the model can easily handle the intuitively plausible notion that identification comes in degrees. Third, he would employ the model to derive general results for a variety of games, including the Stag Hunt and the Battle of the Sexes. The talk builds on an article, 'Identification in Games: Changing Places', published in Erkenntnis 77 [doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9357-0]. (shrink)

We have three goals in this paper. First, we outline an ontology of stance, and explain the role that modes of engagement and styles of reasoning play in the characterization of a stance. Second, we argue that we do enjoy a degree of control over the modes of engagement and styles of reasoning we adopt. Third, we contend that maximizing one’s prospects for change also maximizes one’s rationality.

This paper develops a new version of instrumentalism, in light of progress in the realism debate in recent decades, and thereby defends the view that instrumentalism remains a viable philosophical position on science. The key idea is that talk of unobservable objects should be taken literally only when those objects are assigned properties (or described in terms of analogies involving things) with which we are experientially (or otherwise) acquainted. This is derivative from the instrumentalist tradition in so far as the (...) distinction between unobservable and observable is taken to have significance with respect to meaning. (shrink)

Although the Ca2+‐dependent proteinase (calpain) system has been found in every vertebrate cell that has been examined for its presence and has been detected in Drosophila and parasites, the physiological function(s) of this system remains unclear. Calpain activity has been associated with cleavages that alter regulation of various enzyme activities, with remodeling or disassembly of the cell cytoskeleton, and with cleavages of hormone receptors. The mechanism regulating activity of the calpain system in vivo also is unknown. It has been proposed (...) that binding of the calpains to phospholipid in a cell membrane lowers the Ca2+ concentration, [Ca2+], required for the calpains to autolyze, and that autolysis converts an inactive proenzyme into an active protease. Recent studies, however, show that the calpains bind to specific proteins and not to phospholipids, and that binding to cell membranes does not affect the [Ca2+] required for autolysis. It seems likely that calpain activity is regulated by binding of Ca2+ to specific sites on the calpain molecule, with binding to each site eliciting a response (proteolytic activity, calpastatin binding, etc.) specific for that site. Regulation must also involve an, as yet, undiscovered mechanism that increases the affinity of the Ca2+‐binding sites for Ca2+. (shrink)

This critical commentary on the three sections of the philosophy of subjective spirit as it appears in Hegel's final Berlin Encyclopedia uses them to come to a better understanding and evaluation of his general philosophical perspective. This is in contrast to two sorts of dangers which Hegel scholarship faces. One is getting so caught up in summarizing and interpreting the troublesome texts that no evaluation is provided. The other is to view Hegel unsympathetically through the criteria of contemporary Anglo-America philosophy, (...) so that very little is learned from him except that on most counts he falls short of the standards that this philosophy sets for itself. ;Contrary to these methods I present and evaluate the philosophy of subjective spirit in terms of its fulfillment of the aims of Hegel's system, and in terms of the questions that he suggests it is adequate to answer. There are three such questions. These concern the nature of the relationship between the mind and the body, the compatibility of free human will and natural determination, and the unity of the mind in light of its many activities. ;I also frequently compare Hegel to Kant for two reasons. One is pedagogical, the other intimately related to Hegel's project. We can gain greater understanding of Hegel by illuminating his departures from Kant, about whom much is known. What is more important philosophically, however, is Hegel's criticism of the limits which Kant's transcendental idealism places upon knowledge. The origins of these limits lie in Kant's view of the human mind, the forms of intuition and the spontaneity of understanding. However, if Hegel is to overcome the limits which Kant places upon knowledge, he must provide an account of the mind which circumvents what he considers to be the problems that arise out of Kant's account. ;On most of these counts Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit is a failure, even if his vision is a captivating one. This analysis, however, does reveal certain advantages that Hegel's conception of freedom has over Kant's. (shrink)

Research often characterized as “new materialist” has staged a return/turn to nature in social and critical theory by bringing “matter” into the purview of our research. While this growing impetus to take nature seriously fosters new types of interdisciplinarity and thus new resources for knowing our nature-cultural worlds, its capacity to deal with power’s imbrication in how we understand “nature” is curtailed by its failures to engage substantively with the epistemological interventions of postcolonial feminist science studies. The citational practices of (...) many new materialist thinkers eschew the existence of what Sandra Harding has called “a world of sciences.” I argue that the “science” privileged and often conflated with matter in new materialist storytelling is the same science destabilized by postcolonial feminist science studies. This does not mean that new materialist feminisms and postcolonial feminist science studies are necessarily at odds, as new materialist storytelling and prevailing conceptualizations of the postcolonial seem to suggest. On the contrary, I suggest that thinking creatively, capaciously, pluralistically, and thus irreverently with respect to the rules of science––about the boundaries and meanings of matter, “life,” and “humanness”––could be understood as a central project for a postcolonial feminist science studies. (shrink)

In Making Sense of Life , Keller emphasizes several differences between biology and physics. Her analysis focuses on significant ways in which modelling practices in some areas of biology, especially developmental biology, differ from those of the physical sciences. She suggests that natural models and modelling by homology play a central role in the former but not the latter. In this paper, I focus instead on those practices that are importantly similar, from the point of view of epistemology and cognitive (...) science. I argue that concrete and abstract models are significant in both disciplines, that there are shared selection criteria for models in physics and biology, e.g. familiarity, and that modelling often occurs in a similar fashion. (shrink)

Van Fraassen has recently argued that empiricism can be construed as a stance, involving commitments, attitudes, values, and goals, in addition to beliefs and opinions. But this characterisation emerges from his recognition that to be an empiricist can not be to believe, or decide to commit to belief in, a foundational proposition, without removing any basis for a non-dogmatic empiricist critique of other philosophical approaches, such as materialism. However, noticeable by its absence in Van Fraassen's discussions is any mention of (...) Bartley's ‘pancritical rationalism’, for Bartley offers a cohesive argument that genuine dogmatism lies precisely in the act of commitment to an idea. The consequence of denying this, he thinks, is an opening of the floodgates to irrationalism: if to rely on reasoned argument in decision-making is fundamentally an act of faith, then there is a tu quoque – “I simply have a different faith” – that may be employed by those who wish to shield their views from criticism. This raises the following question: why should it be any less dogmatic to adopt particular commitments, attitudes, values, and goals, rather than a particular belief or opinion, come what may? And if Bartley is right that there is only one non-dogmatic attitude – the critical attitude – then why might this not be adopted by an empiricist, a materialist, a metaphysician, or anyone else? (shrink)

“Will which is actually free is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit.” So opens the section of Hegel’s Encyclopedia known as “Free Spirit.” This text as well as both its immediate textual predecessor “Practical Spirit” and the introduction to the Philosophy of right comprise the mature Hegel’s attempt to give an account of freedom of the will, and mark a full departure from the Kantian standpoint on the matter. While Kant sees the evidence of freedom of the will in (...) the moral ought, Hegel contends that the evidence lies in the actions of individuals within certain social arrangements. (shrink)

According to the standard no miracles argument, science’s predictive success is best explained by the approximate truth of its theories. In contemporary science, however, machine learning systems, such as AlphaFold2, are also remarkably predictively successful. Thus, we might ask what best explains such successes. Might these AIs accurately represent critical aspects of their targets in the world? And if so, does a variant of the no miracles argument apply to these AIs? We argue for an affirmative answer to these questions. (...) We conclude that if the standard no miracles argument is sound, an AI-specific no miracles argument is also sound. (shrink)

The late Professor Basil Willey's important and influential inquiry into the history of religious and moral ideas in the nineteenth century has become (since ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PHARAOH'S.MAGICIANS: THE ETHICS AND EFFICA:CY OF HUMAN FETAiL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS ROBERT BARRY, O.P. Program for the Study of Religion University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana DARREL KESLER Department of Animal Sciences University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana. IN RECENT YEARS increasing attention ha;s been given to v:rurious types of scientific riese,arch involving the human fetus. In the 1970s, :a tremendous amount of concern was expres1 sed IJ.'egiaroing the fetus,a;.s a rSU!bject of e~erimenrtation. (...) In this debate, the announced " research impeiiat:i:ve " was pos,ed against other moral imperativ;es.1 Following much soctiet :JaJl drebarte, protootlive meiaisumeis 1 WeIDe il!dopited 1by oompireihensive regiutatiions in 1975 estaiblishiing protections foT a number of research sUibjects. These regulrutions protect the fetus from non-beneficiail experimentation. that iworuild pose more than minima;l risk rto the fetus. Current debates in science and ethics now swirl arlOiund a new topic regarding human '.fetal life: the fetus as a sourrce of tissue for triansplaintation into other persons ais run e~erimental thempy. It is an issue that is rapidly moving torward the same Jevel of" research imperative" as did the earlier debate on the 1 See Paul Ramsey, The Ethics of Fetal Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975): "Today one often hears statements like' Fetal Research must be done,' or 'It would be immoral not to do this research'" (P. xv). The validity of such opinions and utterances entirely depends on a netbenefits ethics, and the validity of that moral universe has been called increasingly into question in recent years. 575 576 ROBERT BARRY, O.P. AND DARREL KESLER ~etus as subject. Recently,,a new level of intensity was added to this deharte rby the imposition of an indefinite moratorium on federal support for research on transplantrution experiments inv;olving human.fetirul tissue and other!humans. 1Thls " :indefinite moratorium " w1as a result of a process that 1 began with research p110posaJs considered rby the National In- 'stituites of Health (NIH) in October 1987. In Marich 1988 a momtorium wa;g plaioed on the r:eseareh, and an 1advisory panel was summoned to consider the ethical issues involved. This panel presented 1a cveoommendation for the procedures. However, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Ruman Se1wfoes (HHS), Dr. Louis Sullivan, decided against the research proposal on etmcal grounds. His decision w:as with the 'concU'l'Tenoe of the Assistant Secretary :£m.· Health of HHS, Dr. James Mason, who has Tespons~bility for the NIH. Secretary SulliV1an's decision was oommumcarted to the Acting Director of the NIH, Dr. William Raub, in Nov,ember 1989. A :firestorm of criticism erupted from,rudv;ocates of this research, including the Council of Judicial and Ethical Affairs of tihe American Medical Association, which 5.n June 1989 called for an end to the:ban.2 In this article, we wish to question both the science and the ethics of the rproposed fotal tissue transplantation therapy. We!Will 1support the £edeml funding moratorium and surggest new pmtections for the fetuses (whether po,ssibly living or de2 " Medical Applications of Fetal Tissue Transplantation", JAMA, Vol. 263, No. 4, January 26, 1990, 'PP· 565-570. There has been a.great deal of public debate, not only in the U.S. but also in Europe over whether human embryo research should be supported with public funds. Many Catholic countries in Europe have prohibited such research, while a number of other nations have allowed it. Dickson, D., "Europe Split on Embyro Research", Science, Vol. 242, November 21, 1988, pp. 1117-1118. The most interesting controversy is in West Germany where there is a strong movement to prohibit it because many there believe such an experimentation requires judgments that there are certain forms of human life that do not deserve to survive. Ibid., p. 1117. Many Germans regard these sorts of judgments as too close to those made by Nazis, and there is strong sentiment to prohibit such research altogether. Ibid. HUMAN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS 577 oea:sed) of elective a.bortfons. We will also describe new reseaooh directions in t~apy.for the diseases in which it is claimed that fetal... (shrink)

Devoted to making available, in English, contributions to philosophical comprehension originating in German, _Contemporary German Philosophy_ will be a yearbook following volumes reviewing the 1960-80 period. _CGP_'s aim is in no sense to displace the German language as a medium for philosophical discourse, but rather to provide for the reader who is more at home in English some points of access to such of the more pivotal recent and contemporary contributions originating in German as can lend themselves to translation. In (...) the selection of German-language articles for translation, some preference is given to authors whose work for the most part has not yet appeared in English. Original articles by German scholars also will be featured, and there will be reviews and comments by a worldwide body of scholars concerned with German philosophical traditions. _CGP_ is open to the full range of philosophical interests and orientations to which philosophy in the German language and tradition contributes. It is open as well to items which consider the bearings of insights within such allied fields as mathematics, political science, historiography, and linguistics upon philosophical issues. The term "contemporary" is intended to refer, not to any particular style of doing philosophy, but to philosophical literature of recent origin. (shrink)

In order to acquaint the academic professions with the function and direction of projected development of The Owl of Minerva and the Hegel Society of America, the first three issues have been distributed to departments of philosophy throughout the U. S. and Canada as well as to many individuals and institutions in other countries. The projected enlargement of the scope of the publication makes even more apparent than it would otherwise be the need at this time to restrict distribution to (...) members of HSA, persons whose indication of interest suggests that they may intend shortly to become members, subscribing libraries, and editors. (shrink)

Abstract:Enlightenment era optimism that technological and educational developments offer a progressive path to plenty and liberation supports a hope that human toil may be progressively reduced. The Development Thesis defended by G. A. Cohen is a piece of that Enlightenment optimism. The Development Thesis holds that productive forces tend to develop throughout history. The tendency for such an increase in productive forces to occur is, according to Cohen’s argument, due to persistent facts about human nature. If Cohen is correct, there (...) is a tendency toward progress of an important sort, and this progress is due in significant part to human nature. But the development of productive forces also destroys nonhuman natural value. In the era of the Anthropocene this is occurring on a planetary scale. The simultaneous development and destruction entails that claims of progress must rely on an all-things-considered judgment. But due to the plurality of the relevant values, which cannot be compared according to a common metric, rational disagreement about the existence of progress and our progressive nature can be expected to persist. (shrink)

Habermas asserts that his discourse ethics rests on two main commitments: (1) Moral judgments have cognitive content analogous to truth value; and (2) moral justification requires real-life discourse. Habermas elaborates on the second claim by making actual consensus a necessary condition of normative validity. I argue that Habermas's two commitments sit uneasily together. The second entails that his cognitivism is revisionist in the sense that it must reject the law of the excluded middle. Moreover, Habermas's argument in defence of the (...) need for real-life discourse is unconvincing and his derivation of the principle which requires consensus is fallacious. (shrink)

This paper argues that Duhem’s thesis does not decisively refute a corroboration-based account of scientific methodology (or ‘falsificationism’), but instead that auxiliary hypotheses are themselves subject to measurements of corroboration which can be used to inform practice. It argues that a corroboration-based account is equal to the popular Bayesian alternative, which has received much more recent attention, in this respect.

Thomas Aquinas, one of the "founding fathers" of just war theory, offers an account of virtuous warfare in practice. The author argues that Aquinas's approach to warfare, with its emphasis on justice and charity, is helpful in providing a coherent moral account of war to which Christians can subscribe. Particular attention is given to the role of charity, since this virtue is the distinguishing characteristic of the Christian soldier. Charity compels him to soldier justly, and by fighting justly, he is (...) elevated by God to friendship with God. Notable features of this approach are its emphasis on the criteria for judging whether a war is just and its relativizing of the criteria for proper combat behavior. (shrink)

This paper challenges a recent argument of Bird’s, which involves imagining that Réné Blondlot’s belief in N-rays was true, in favour of the view that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge rather than truth. By considering several variants of Bird’s thought-experiment, it shows that the semantic account of progress cannot be so easily vanquished. A key possibility is that justification is only instrumental in, and not partly constitutive of, progress.

Building on the views of Kant and early nineteenth century life scientists, Hegel develops a view of systems that is a clear precursor to the developments in Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general system theory, as well as the thinking of the ecologically minded system thinkers that built upon the foundation Bertalanffy laid. Hegel describes systems as organic wholes in which the parts respectively serve as means and ends. Further, in the Encyclopedia version of the logic Hegel notes that such systems are (...) comprised of three processes: gestalt, the process of assimilation, and regeneration. In Hegel’s texts, he describes both natural and social systems as organic wholes with such systematic processes. In this paper, these processes and systems are described and it is argued that Hegel quite consistently applies views developed in the logic when describing systems. The paper shows how this parallels later developments in systems theory and goes on to show some distinctions between Hegel’s view of systems and that of later ecologically minded system thinkers. (shrink)

First, I argue that scientific progress is possible in the absence of increasing verisimilitude in science’s theories. Second, I argue that increasing theoretical verisimilitude is not the central, or primary, dimension of scientific progress. Third, I defend my previous argument that unjustified changes in scientific belief may be progressive. Fourth, I illustrate how false beliefs can promote scientific progress in ways that cannot be explicated by appeal to verisimilitude.

In a recent contribution to Learning for Democracy, Richard Bailey argues that Thomas Kuhn advocated an indoctrinatory model of science education, which is fundamentally authority-based. While agreeing with Bailey’s conclusion, this article suggests that Kuhn was attempting to solve an important problem which Bailey only touches on – how to ensure that science students do not become hypercritical. It continues by offering a critical rationalist solution to this problem, arguing that paradigms qua exemplars should be historical problem-solving episodes, rather than (...) model solutions to puzzles. (shrink)

When a doctor tells you there’s a one percent chance that an operation will result in your death, or a scientist claims that his theory is probably true, what exactly does that mean? Understanding probability is clearly very important, if we are to make good theoretical and practical choices. In this engaging and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of probability, Darrell Rowbottom takes the reader on a journey through all the major interpretations of probability, with reference to real–world (...) situations. In lucid prose, he explores the many fallacies of probabilistic reasoning, such as the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ and the ‘inverse fallacy’, and shows how we can avoid falling into these traps by using the interpretations presented. He also illustrates the relevance of the interpretation of probability across disciplinary boundaries, by examining which interpretations of probability are appropriate in diverse areas such as quantum mechanics, game theory, and genetics. Using entertaining dialogues to draw out the key issues at stake, this unique book will appeal to students and scholars across philosophy, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. (shrink)